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This paper relates predictable gains from positions in fed funds futures contracts to violations of the
expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates.  Although evidence for predictable gains
from positions in short-horizon contracts is mixed, we find that gains in longer horizon contracts can
be well described using Markov-switching models, with predictability associated with particular episodes
in which economic activity was weak and variability in the returns to these contracts was quite high.
James D. Hamilton
Department of Economics, 0508
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive




Graduate School of International Corporate Strateg
Hitotsubashi University
2-1-2 Hitotsubashi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-8439, JA
tatsuyoshi.okimoto@gmail.com1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The strong formulation of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest
rates conjectures that the expected holding yields from long-term and short-term bonds
should be the same, while the weak form of the expectations hypothesis allows the holding
yields to diﬀer by a constant term premium. These are approximately equivalent1 to
the claims that the long rate should equal the average of expected future short rates
under the strong form, or an average plus a constant term premium under the weak
form. Although these are a priori appealing hypotheses, even the weak forms have been
consistently rejected by empirical researchers; see Campbell and Shiller (1991), Evans and
Lewis (1994), Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (1997), and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005),
among many others. Notwithstanding, Rudebusch (1995) and Longstaﬀ (2000) suggested
that the expectations hypothesis may not be a bad approximation at the shortest end of
the term structure.
Another well-established empirical ﬁnding is that short-term interest rates can be
usefully described using Markov regime-switching models such as proposed by Hamilton
(1989); see for example Hamilton (1988), Garcia and Perron (1996), Gray (1996), Ang
and Bekaert (2002), Sims and Zha (2006), and Inoue and Okimoto (2008). A number of
researchers have reported considerable improvements in models of the term structure of
interest rates by incorporating these regime changes, including Bansal and Zhou (2002),
Evans (2003), Dai, Singleton, and Yang (2007), and Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2008).
A separate literature has examined whether expected gains from long positions in fed
funds futures contracts are zero, or equivalently, whether these contracts incorporate an
optimal forecast of future fed funds rates. Previous studies include Krueger and Kuttner
(1996), Rudebusch (1998), Kuttner (2001), Sack (2004), Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson
(2007), Piazzesi and Swanson (2008), and Hamilton (2009a). While these studies all
support the view that fed funds futures provide an excellent forecast of fed funds rates,
they have often also found some evidence of predictable gains, particularly for fed funds
futures contracts at longer maturities.
The purpose of the present paper is to investigate the extent to which changes in regime
can account for these predictable gains from positions in fed funds futures contracts. A
1See Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997, Section 10.2).
3companion paper by Bundick (2007) has also ﬁt regime-switching models to fed funds
futures. Bundick’s analysis begins in 1995, whereas some of the most interesting features
we highlight occurred in the early 1990s. Bundick studied the n-month gains from holding
these contracts to maturity, whereas we use 1-month holding gains throughout, which
simpliﬁes the implied dynamic structure under both null and alternative hypotheses. And
whereas Bundick’s primary focus was on constructing an optimal forecast of the future fed
funds rate, here our emphasis is on characterizing the nature of the implicit risk premium
associated with these contracts.
Like Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) and Hamilton (2009a), we ﬁnd the most persuasive
evidence of predictable gains for the longer horizon futures contracts. Our results suggest
that predictable gains are primarily associated with one particular regime that is char-
acterized by unusual volatility in the holding gains and tends to coincide with episodes
of weak economic growth or recession. These results also complement the ﬁndings by
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) that predicted excess holding yields from long-term bonds
are countercyclical, and by Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) that expected holding gains
from long positions in fed funds futures contracts are countercyclical. We suggest that
at least in the case of fed funds futures contracts, this phenomena is better characterized
as a feature conﬁned to particular historical episodes rather than present throughout the
sample.
T h ep l a no ft h ep a p e ri sa sf o l l o w s . I nS e c t i o n2w eb r i e ﬂy explore the theoretical
connection between the term structure of interest rates and predictable gains from fed
funds futures contracts. Empirical results are presented in Section 3, and implications for
the most recent behavior of fed funds futures are noted in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Risk premia in interest rates and fed funds futures.
Let Pnt denote the price paid at time t for a pure-discount bond that will be worth $1
with certainty at t+n and let Mt denote the stochastic discount factor. Standard ﬁnance
theory (e.g., Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997, p.428) asserts that





i=1 Mt+i. Consider a forward contract agreed to at date t to buy a one-
period bond at t+n, whose value will be $1 at t+n+1. Let Snt denote the price agreed to
under the contract and P1,t+n what the actual price of the bond turns out to be. Absence
of arbitrage requires the forward price to satisfy






Evaluating (1) for a 1-period bond at date t + n,
P1,t+n = Et+n[Mt+n+1]. (3)








This forward price Snt will be recognized as the reciprocal of the gross forward interest
rate; see Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997, equation 10.1.7).
When the term structure of interest rates slopes up (bonds of higher maturities n have
higher yields), the value of Snt for given t would typically be a decreasing function of the
horizon n. Thus in a stationary environment, a term premium that induces an average
positive slope to the term structure would result in Sn,t−1 − Sn−1,t < 0 on average.
Fed funds futures contracts are settled based on the average value of the overnight fed
funds rate during the expiry month. Insofar as these behave like forward contracts on
the future price of one-period bonds, fed funds futures contracts should inherit the same
pricing premia as the term structure of interest rates. Let fnt denote the interest rate
implied as of the last day of month t by a fed funds futures contract expiring n months
subsequently, and rt+n the actual average fed funds rate for month t+n. In the absence
of arbitrage, the futures contracts must be priced such that
Et(Mt,t+nfn,t)=Et(Mt,t+nrt+n).
5Note that if the fed funds rate at time t + n were given by one minus the risk-free
one-period bond price at that date, that is, if
rt+n =1− P1,t+n, (5)
then the fed funds futures rate fnt would be exactly equal to 1−Snt under the assumption
of no arbitrage. In practice, however, we should not expect this condition to hold exactly.
Fed funds contracts are based on a monthly average of daily values for overnight fed funds,
which diﬀers from the end-of-month concept P1t. Moreover, lending overnight fed funds
is not completely risk free, the yield is the nonlinear function (1/P1t) − 1 rather than
1 − P1t, and margin requirements are marked to market daily unlike a pure forward
contract. For these reasons, fnt ' 1 − Snt is only an approximation. Nonetheless, it
would be surprising if fed funds futures contracts behave grossly out of line with risk
premia in the term structure.
Following Piazzesi and Swanson (2008), we deﬁne the one-month holding gain unt
to be the proﬁt (or loss if negative value) from taking the long position in an n-month
contract on the last day of month t−1 a n dc l o s i n gt h ep o s i t i o no nt h el a s td a yo fm o n t h
t:
unt = fn,t−1 − fn−1,t. (6)
For n =1 , the value of u1t is the diﬀerence between the 1-month futures rate at the end
of month t − 1 a n dt h ea c t u a lf e df u n d sr a t ee x p e r i e n c e di nm o n t ht:
u1t = f1,t−1 − rt.
The strong form of the expectations hypothesis would require E(unt =0 ) , and the weak
form Et−1(unt)=cn. A violation of the strong form of the expectations hypothesis in the
form of a positively sloped yield curve would cause Sn,t−1 − Sn−1,t < 0 on average, under
which we would expect unt to be positive on average. If the long rate is above the average
of expected future short rates, then the forward rate should be above the expected future
spot rate, and the interest rate fnt associated with a given contract should on average
decline as the contract gets closer to expiry, i.e., as n decreases and t increases, implying
a positive average value for unt. The positive average slope to the yield curve is of course
well-documented, and Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) found evidence for positive values of
6unt for all n. However, just as the evidence against the expectations hypothesis of the
term structure is weakest for securities with maturity n less than 2 months (Rudebusch,
1995; Longstaﬀ, 2000), evidence for predictable variation in the fed funds futures revisions
unt is weakest for small n (Piazzesi and Swanson, 2008; Hamilton, 2009a).
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Autoregressive speciﬁcations
The basic data used in this study are the monthly changes in the prices of contracts
with one to six months of settlement and purchased from the Chicago Board of Trade.
We calculate fnt (in basis points) from the end-of-month closing contract price Qnt as
fnt =1 0 0× (100 − Qnt) and unt from (6). The sample period is from November 1990 to
June, 2006.2 The main purpose of the paper is to examine possible regime switches in the
one-month holding gains associated with long positions in contracts of various maturities.
As a starting point, we estimated a simple Gaussian AR(1) model,
unt = αn + φnun,t−1 + σnεnt,ε nt ∼ N(0,1), (7)
for horizons n =1 ,...,6 months using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), in this
case equivalent to ordinary least squares. The estimation results are summarized in Table
1. As can be seen, the constant terms are estimated to be positive and statistically
signiﬁcant for all horizons, consistent with an upward-sloping yield curve or positive risk
premia on longer term bonds. The AR(1) terms are signiﬁcantly positive for all horizons
longer than one month, suggesting variation over time in these risk premia. The implied
average holding gain given by µn = αn/(1 − φn) is increasing in the horizon n, ranging
from 2.7 to 6.1 basis points per month (32-73 bp per year), which is fairly consistent
with the results of Piazzesi and Swanson (2008). Regarding the explanatory power, the
coeﬃcient of determination, R2, suggests that the AR(1) model can explain about 13% of
the variation in one-month holding gains on federal funds futures if the horizon is longer
than two months.
2Federal funds futures price data are available from October 1988. However, we chose November 1990
as the beginning of our sample, since the longer horizon contracts were not traded frequently in the ﬁrst
two years of the data. Our sample ends prior to the most recent turbulence in fed funds and other
ﬁnancial markets.
7We then compared this speciﬁcation with a two-state Markov switching AR(1) (MSAR(1))
model:
unt = αn,st + φn,stun,t−1 + σn,stεt,ε nt ∼ N(0,1), (8)
where st is an unobserved latent variable presumed to follow a two-state ﬁrst-order Markov
chain. The maximum likelihood estimates reported in Table 2 identify two distinct regimes
in fed funds futures prices. The ﬁrst regime is characterized by a high risk premium
(αn1 > 0) and high volatility (σn1 >> σn2), while the second regime is associated with
little risk premium and low volatility. Note that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of
zero average risk premium in regime 2 (αn2 =0 )for every maturity n.
Table 3 reports tests of the hypothesis that parameters are constant across the two
regimes.3 The diﬀerences in the constant term and volatility are highly signiﬁcant for all
horizons. On the other hand, the diﬀerences in the AR coeﬃc i e n ta r en o ts i g n i ﬁcant at
the 10% signiﬁcance level for any horizon longer than one month.
To assess the in-sample ﬁt of the Markov switching models we use the Markov switching
criterion (MSC) recently proposed by Smith, Naik, and Tsai (2006). The MSC asymp-
totically is a generalization of the Akaike Information Criterion. The MSC is based on
the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the true and candidate models and is calculated
as
MSC = −2log(f(Y,ˆ θ)) +
N X
i=1
ˆ Ti(ˆ Ti + λiK)
δi ˆ Ti − λiK − 2
,
where log(f(Y,ˆ θ)) is the maximized log-likelihood value, N is the number of regimes,
ˆ Ti =
PT
t=1ˆ ξti, ˆ ξti is the smoothed probability of the regime i at time t, K is the number
of regressors, and δi and λi are tuning parameters. Following the suggestion of Smith,
Naik, and Tsai (2006), we set δi =1and λi = N. In our case, N =2for the Markov-
switching speciﬁcations and N =1with no Markov-switching. The smaller the value
for MSC, the better the model is judged to be. The values for MSC given in Panel A
of Table 4 suggest that the MSAR(1) model would be selected over the AR(1) model for
every horizon n.
3Standard tests of the null hypothesis of no Markov switching are plagued by the problem that nuisance
parameters are unidentiﬁed under the null. This problem is avoided here, insofar as the null hypothesis
of constant coeﬃcients still allows the regime transition probabilities to be identiﬁed from diﬀerences in
variances, as in Engel and Hamilton (1990).
8We also compared models based on the out-of-sample root-mean-squared forecast er-
rors (RMSE) on data since 2000 as follows. First, we estimated both AR(1) and MSAR(1)
models using data from November 1990 to December 1999 and evaluated the terminal 1-
month-ahead forecast error based on the estimation results. The data were then updated
by 1-month, and the terminal 1-month-ahead forecast error was re-calculated from the
updated sample (speciﬁcally, from November 1990 to January 2000). This procedure
was repeated until one month before the end of the sample period, namely May 2006.
Panel B of Table 4 reports the values of RMSE for the AR(1) and MSAR(1) models.
As can be seen, the RMSE of the MSAR(1) model is uniformly smaller than that of the
AR(1) model, meaning the MSAR(1) model provided better post-sample forecasts than
the AR(1) model.
Are these diﬀerences in post-sample forecasting accuracy statistically signiﬁcant? West
(2006) noted the problems with testing the null hypothesis of no improvement in fore-
casting accuracy for situations like ours in which competing models are nested. Clark
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2
where ˆ y1,t+1 is the forecast for date t +1based on the more parsimonious model (in
this case, the AR(1) model with no Markov switching) as estimated using observations
through date t, ˆ y2,t+1 the forecast from the bigger model (in this case, the MSAR(1)),
and ˆ ei,t+1 = yt+1 − ˆ yi,t+1 denote the respective forecast errors. The test statistic is







t=R (st+1 − ¯ s)2
(9)





Although the asymptotic distribution of CW is unknown, Clark and West (2007)
suggested that the N(0,1) distribution gives a conservative approximation in the sense
that if the null hypothesis is true (that is, if the parsimonious model is the correct one),
then CW should exceed the N(0,1) 5% critical value (1.645) a little less than 5% of
9the time. We also performed a small Monte Carlo investigation of the accuracy of the
Normal approximation in our setting. For each n, we generated 1000 samples from the
ﬁtted AR(1) speciﬁcation and recursively estimated on these generated samples AR(1)
and MSAR(1) models from which the statistic CW was calculated. We found that under
the null hypothesis that the true data-generating process is an AR(1) with values equal
to the estimated coeﬃcients from the sample, the CW statistic exceeded 1.645 with a
probability between 0.027 (for n =2 )and 0.048 (for n =4 ), conﬁrming Clark and West’s
suggestion that the N(0,1) distribution provides a good conservative approximation to
the true test size.
The ﬁrst row of Panel C of Table 4 reports the Clark-West statistic CW for testing
the null hypothesis that the MSAR(1) oﬀers no improvement in post-sample MSE over
the simple AR(1). The second row reports an approximate upper bound for the p-value
based on the Normal approximation, which indicates that the improvements in MSE are
statistically signiﬁcant in every case. The third row in Table 4C labeled “Monte Carlo
p-value” is the fraction of times the generated statistic CW exceeded the value obtained
in the ﬁrst row for the actual data for our 1000 simulated AR(1) samples. These results
conﬁrm that the Markov-switching autoregression is a better model for forecasting holding
gains.
Figure 1 plots the smoothed probabilities of regime 1 (high risk premium with high
volatility regime). As was also reported by Bundick (2007), for the 1-month contracts
the moves in and out of regime 1 occur quite frequently, whereas regime 1 for the longer
horizon contracts is associated with a few episodes of longer duration. Two of these occur
prior to and following the recessions of 1990-91 and 2001, and a third is associated with
1994-95.
Figure 1 also plots gray regions for episodes in which the Fed was lowering its target
for the fed funds rate. These dates also correlate with occurrences of regime 1. The fact
that αn1 > 0 means that in regime 1 one could predict that rt+n will be lower on average
than fnt, or the fed funds market seems to underestimate the likelihood or magnitude of
a funds rate cut at these times. On the other hand, although our model implies that
the Fed will likely cut rates in these episodes, it also maintains that it is most diﬃcult
to predict interest rates at these times (σn1 >> σn2). Interpreted as a risk premium, the
10claim is that at these times, holders of long-term bonds receive extra compensation for
their risk, and this pricing of risk is mirrored in that those who take the long position in
fed funds futures are rewarded on average for those positions.
Following Hamilton (2009a, 2009b), we also investigated whether the improved perfor-
mance of the Markov-switching speciﬁcations results from its description of the conditional
variance rather than the conditional mean. We generalized the baseline autoregression
(7) to allow for outliers and heteroskedastacity, using an EGARCH(1,1) speciﬁcation with
at i m et r e n d 4 in the variance,
unt = αn + φnun,t−1 + ent, (10)
with ent drawn from a Student t distribution with νn degrees of freedom and scale para-
meter hnt evolving according to
loghnt − γn − ξnt = δ[loghn,t−1 − γn − ξn(t − 1)] + ηn(|en,t−1/hn,t−1| − kνn). (11)
Estimates for the parameters are reported in Table 5. Consistent with the results in
Hamilton (2009a), when heteroskedasticity and fat tails are allowed for in the estimation,
the intercept αn for n =1to 3 changes signs and is no longer statistically signiﬁcant. The
autoregressive parameter is statistically signiﬁcant for n ≥ 2 but not for n =1 . As seen
in row 3 of Table 4A, the EGARCH-AR(1) speciﬁcation (10)-(11) has a better in-sample
ﬁt in terms of the Markov Switching Criterion for n =1to 4, while the Markov-switching
speciﬁcation (8) does better at horizons 5 and 6. The success of the Markov-switching
speciﬁcation for short horizons relative to the homoskedastic Gaussian AR(1) thus results
in part from its description of a time-varying variance which might be more parsimoniously
captured with an EGARCH speciﬁcation. For the longer horizons, however, the broad
episodes of predictability described by the Markov-switching model appear to be a genuine
feature of the data.
In row 3 of Table 4B we compare the EGARCH-AR(1) speciﬁcation with the oth-
ers in terms of the post-sample forecasts. The EGARCH speciﬁcation does as well as
Markov-switching for n =1 , while the MS models do uniformly better than EGARCH
at longer horizons. The last row of Table 4C shows that the EGARCH speciﬁcation
4As in Hamilton (2009a), we scaled the time trend by dividing by 1000 for better numerical stability.
11yields statistically signiﬁcantly better forecasts than the simple AR(1) only for the n =1
horizon.
We also estimated more restricted versions of the EGARCH speciﬁcation that imposed
ac o n s t a n tr i s kp r e m i u m( φn =0 )or zero risk premium (αn = φn =0 ) . Both in sample
and out of sample these tend to be dominated by both the unrestricted EGARCH-AR(1)
and the Markov-switching AR(1).
3.2 Predictive regression models
We now explore the role of a set of other variables besides lagged gains that might help
predict holding gains on fed funds contracts. We use the set of variables proposed by
Piazzesi and Swanson (2004, 2008) and also used by Hamilton (2009a). These explanatory
variables include the employment growth rate, the credit spread, and assorted treasury
yield spreads. For employment growth we looked at two measures. The ﬁrst is the
12-month change in the logarithm of seasonally adjusted nonfarm payrolls for the period
ended in month t − 2. Although a value for this number would have been known to
market participants as of the end of month t − 1, the currently revised series is not the
same as the number actually available at the time. We therefore also conducted these
tests using the 12-month growth in seasonally unadjusted nonfarm payrolls as reported
at the time from the real-time data set of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Our measure for the credit spread is the diﬀerence between Baa-corporate and 10-year
treasury yields (in basis points). We also used four diﬀerent treasury spreads based on
diﬀerences of the 6-month, 1-, 2-, 5-, and 10-year treasury yields. All data other than
the real-time employment series were obtained from the FRED database of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
We explored the role of the above list of explanatory variables, taken one at a time,
in predictive regressions for three sets of speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst is a homoskedastic
Gaussian regression:
unt = αn + φnun,t−1 + βnxt−1 + σnεnt,ε nt ∼ N(0,1). (12)
We compared this with a Markov-switching predictive regression (MSPR),
unt = αn,st + φn,stun,t−1 + βn,stxt−1 + σn,stεnt,ε nt ∼ N(0,1) (13)
12and a predictive regression with EGARCH Student t errors,
unt = αn + φnun,t−1 + βnxt−1 + ent (14)
where ent is drawn from a Student t distribution with νn degrees of freedom and scale
parameter hnt evolving according to (11).
Figure 2 illustrates the diﬀerence between the predictions of the Markov-switching
formulation with no explanatory variables (8) and the simple predictive regression (12)
for the case when employment growth is the explanatory variable and n =6 . The actual
1-month gain from taking the long position in a 6-month fed funds futures contract at the
end of month t−1 a n dc l o s i n gt h ep o s i t i o na tt h ee n do fm o n t ht is plotted as the dotted
line. The predicted gain as of time t−1 a c c o r d i n gt ot h eM a r k o v - s w i t c h i n gs p e c i ﬁcation is
given by the gray line, while that from the homoskedastic predictive regression is shown in
bold. The two formulations are both capturing the tendency for there to be bigger gains
in the early 1990s and early 2000s, the predictive regression because these were episodes
of falling employment, and the Markov-switching model because they were identiﬁed as
associated with regime 1. The latter does a better job of recognizing the shift in 2003 to
a regime in which there were no longer expected gains associated with these contracts.
Ferrero and Nobili (2009) raised concerns about the stability of predictive regressions
like these, though this may be less signiﬁcant for our speciﬁcations and sample than
for the ones they explored. Following Piazzesi and Swanson (2008), we estimated the
speciﬁcations (12) and (13) for a sample that begins in November 1990 and ends in
month R for every date R between July 1996 and June 2006. The top panel of Figure
3 compares the forecast for each R from this rolling predictive regression with the full-
sample regression for xt−1 corresponding to the 12-month employment growth measure
and n =4 . The forecasts are similar and do not diﬀer much over the sample. The
middle panel compares a rolling Markov-switching predictive regression with the full-
sample Markov-switching predictive regression, which again do not diﬀer much. The
bottom panel compares rolling-sample and full-sample forecasts from the simple MSAR
speciﬁcation (8) with no explanatory variables, which are often quite close.5
5Note that the most signiﬁcant instability found in the tests reported in Table A1 in Ferrero and
Nobili (2009) comes from the speciﬁcations with their n greater than 3 quarters, whereas the longest
speciﬁcation we consider uses 6-month contracts. Ferrero and Nobili’s decomposition of excess returns
13Comparisons among the diﬀerent predictive regression speciﬁcations based on the in-
sample MSC are reported in Table 6. For, every n, the Markov-switching model with no
explanatory variables is seen in the second row of Table 4A to achieve better MSC than
any predictive regression using any explanatory variable in Table 6A. In fact, for the
n =6case, the Markov-switching autoregression does better than any Markov-switching
or EGARCH predictive regression using any explanatory variable, with the single excep-
tion of the Markov-switching regression based on the 1 year minus 6 month spread. The
Markov-switching autoregression also performs well among this group at predicting the 5-
month contract gains, but for shorter horizons it tends to be dominated by the EGARCH
predictive regressions. More generally, we can make the following observations from the
results in Table 6. First, for every explanatory variable and every horizon, the Gaussian
predictive regression (12) is dominated by both the Markov-switching and EGARCH pre-
dictive regressions. Second, for most explanatory variables and horizons, the EGARCH
predictive regressions do better than the Markov-switching predictive regressions.
In comparing across explanatory variables and speciﬁcations, for horizons 5 and 6
the Markov-switching predictive regression based on the 1-year minus 6-month treasury
spread has the best ﬁt to the data, while for horizons 2 and 3, an EGARCH speciﬁcation
based on this same variable does best. For n =1 , an EGARCH formulation based on the
2-year minus the 1-year spread does best, while for n =4 , EGARCH using 2-year minus
1-year does about the same as Markov-switching using 1-year minus 6-month.
Table 7 reports the estimated values for βn1 and βn2 for each of the Markov-switching
predictive regressions. With the exception of the last two term spreads, the estimated
value for βn2 is always statistically indistinguisable from zero, reinforcing our conclusion
that the main evidence for predictable holding yields comes from regime 1. In fact,
something similar in practice is implied even for the term spread speciﬁcations in which
βn1 is often negative and βn2 is positive and sometimes statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 8 reports the full parameter estimates for the Markov-switching predictive regres-
sions based on the 1-year minus 6-month spread. Using the n =5results for illustration,
into a risk premium and forecast error is also very interesting, though lack of monthly-horizon survey
data for our full sample makes it infeasible to replicate their approach in our setting.
14the net contribution of the intercept and spread is positive on average in regime 1,
α51 + β51s1y,6m =1 5 .8 − (0.186)(17.6) = 12.5,
for s1y,6m =1 7 .6 the average 1-year minus 6-month spread. If the spread is above its
average value, the expected value of u5t would be less 12.5— a more steeply sloped yield
curve lessens the expected proﬁtability of a long position in 5-month fed funds futures in
this regime. By contrast, the typical expected drift in regime 2 is essentially zero, just
as it was in the simple MSAR formulation:
α52 + β52s = −6.4+( 0 .33)(17.6) = −0.6.
In this case, if the yield curve becomes more steeply sloped than average, it suggests there
is a small proﬁt opportunity from taking a long position in fed funds futures. Figure 4
displays the diﬀerence between the predicted values from MSAR (8) and MSPR (13) for
the case n =5 .
Table 9 reports the post-sample root-mean-square errors for the various predictive
regressions estimated. Predictive EGARCH regressions based on employment growth do
best for the 1- and 2-month contracts, while predictive Markov-switching regressions using
the 1y-6m or 10y-5y spreads do best for the 3- to 6-month contracts among the predictive
regressions. The MSAR speciﬁcation turns out to dominate all other models for n =5in
terms of post-sample performance. Panels B and C of Table 9 also report approximate p-
values (based on the N(0,1) approximation to the Clark-West test statistic (9)) for the test
of the null hypothesis that the forecast in Panel B or C is no better than the corresponding
entry in Panel A. The forecast improvement of the Markov-switching predictive regression
over the homoskedastic predictive regressions is statistically signiﬁcant in almost all cases.
T h ei m p r o v e m e n to ft h eE G A R C Hp r e d i c t i v er e g r e s s i o no v e rt h eh o m o s k e d a s t i cp r e d i c t i v e
regression is statistically signiﬁcant in 2/3 of the cases.
4 Application: Interpreting fed funds futures in July
2009.
We illustrate some implications and potential uses of these estimates by taking a look at
fed funds futures prices in the summer of 2009. During the ﬁrst half of 2009, the Fed had
15announced a target range for the fed funds rate of between 0 and 25 basis points. The
actual average monthly fed funds rate was between 15 and 22 basis points over these 6
months, averaging 18 bp.
The interest rates implied by fed funds futures contracts as of June 30 are plotted as
the solid line in Figure 5. These rise steadily to a value of 35 basis points for the December
contract. Some analysts had interpreted that modest slope to a belief by traders that
there was some possibility that the Fed could increase its target before the end of the year,
despite statements from Fed oﬃcials that seemed to suggest such a change was unlikely.
To what extent is it plausible to attribute this slope instead to the pricing of risk
implicit in these contracts? One quick way to answer this question is to look at the
average historical discrepancy between the fed funds futures contract and what the actual
interest rate turned out to be. The average value of u1t in our sample is 2.9 basis points,
from which, as in Piazzesi and Swanson (2008), one might calculate a “risk-adjusted”
market forecast that is 2.9 basis points below the 1-month fed funds futures rate f1t. The
average value of u2t is 6.9, implying that f2t exceeded rt+2 on average by 2.9+6 .9=9 .8
basis points, for a risk-adjusted implied forecast of f2t − 9.8.
The dashed line in Figure 5 uses these calculations to calculate what we’d expect the
fed funds futures rate to be as of June 30, 2009 if investors in fact believed that the
actual rate each month would be the same 18 basis points observed in the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h e
year, but these contracts incorporated risk premia consistent with their average ex post
gains on fed funds contracts of diﬀerent maturities. Such a calculation suggests that the
modest upward slope in fed funds futures in the summer of 2009 is fully consistent with
a belief by market participants that the actual fed funds rate was unlikely to change.
Our Markov-switching framework suggests that average pricing of risk over the entire
sample in fact arises from a few episodes associated with weak economic activity and
highly volatile interest rates in which the risk premium was quite large. Conditions in
2009 are clearly outside of the range included in the sample, both in the severity of the
economic downturn and in the fact that the fed funds rate had eﬀectively bumped against
the zero lower bound, which is why we did not attempt to use these data in the estimation.
However, it is interesting to take a look at what the model would imply if we assumed
that the economy was in regime 1 in June of 2009 and that the 1-year minus 6-month
16spread at that time (21 basis points) was expected to persist through the end of the year.
Let
ˆ un,t+j|t(ik,i k−1,...,i1)
= E(un,t+j|unt,s n,t+k = ik,s n,t+k−1 = ik−1,...,sn,t+1 = i1,s t =1 )
denote the forecast conditional on knowing the future regimes, which can be generated
recursively from
ˆ un,t+j|t(ik,i k−1,...,i1)=φn,ijˆ un,t+j−1|t(ik,i k−1,...,i1)+cn,ij
for cnj = αnj +2 1 βnj. The unconditional forecast is then








ˆ un,t+k|t(ik,i k−1,...,i1)pn,1,i1pn,i1,i2 ···pn,ik−1,ik. (15)
Note the identity
fkt = rt+k +( f1,t+k−1 − rt+k)+( f2,t+k−2 − f1,t+k−1)+···+( fk,t − fk−1,t+1)
= rt+k + u1,t+k + u2,t+k−1 + ···+ uk,t+1. (16)
Taking conditional expectations of (16),
fkt = E(rt+k|unt,s t =1 )+
k X
j=1
E(uj,t+j|unt,s t =1 ) . (17)
Thus if we supposed that the market expectation of fed funds rates for the remainder of
2009 was a constant 18 basis points,
E(rt+k|unt,s t =1 )=1 8 k =1 ,2,...,6,
equations (17) and (15) imply a value for fkt that we would expect to see. These values
are plotted as the dotted line in Figure 5. This prediction is uniformly above the average
risk premia correction, because with a 1-year minus 6-month spread of 21 basis points,
the MS predictive regressions in Table 7 imply bigger risk premia when the economy is
in regime 1 than observed on average.
The results of this exercise suggest that the modest upward slope of the futures curve
in the summer of 2009 could easily be entirely accounted for by risk premia in these
contracts, and need not be interpreted as a belief by market participants that an increase
in the target fed funds rate before the end of 2009 was a material possibility.
175 Conclusions.
In this paper we have conﬁrmed the ﬁndings of previous researchers that while it is diﬃcult
to make a better prediction of the fed funds rate than is incorporated in near-term fed
funds futures contracts, for longer horizons there is a systematic gain for those taking the
long position in these contracts, that is, the actual fed funds rate is likely to end up below
the forward rate implied by the contract. We related this to the tendency of treasury
securities of longer maturities to provide a higher yield on average than those of shorter
maturities, and studied time-variation in the predictable contract gain over the period
1990-2006. We found that the predictable gain for these contracts is primarily coming
from particular episodes of weak economic activity in the early 1990s, 1995, and 2001-
2002. Although a speculator could expect a positive average gain from a long position
in fed funds futures at such times, they are also associated with much more variance of
the gain.
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Table 1: Estimation results for the AR(1) model 
 
n 123456
α 2.716 3.106 2.511 3.071 3.536 4.076
std error 0.744 1.000 1.015 1.284 1.466 1.667
φ -0.011 0.147 0.366 0.372 0.357 0.330
std error 0.076 0.074 0.074 0.069 0.071 0.071
σ 9.70 13.05 14.50 16.77 19.24 21.91
s t d  e r r o r0 . 5 40 . 6 80 . 7 60 . 8 70 . 9 51 . 0 6
R
2 0.000 0.024 0.139 0.143 0.129 0.110




Table 2: Estimation results for the MSAR(1) model 
 
n 123456
p11 0.788 0.792 0.920 0.937 0.935 0.937
std error 0.074 0.103 0.057 0.052 0.047 0.040
p22 0.840 0.910 0.970 0.966 0.971 0.973
std error 0.047 0.042 0.019 0.027 0.019 0.017
α1 7.15 11.9 9.83 10.3 21.8 24.1
s t d  e r r o r1 . 7 63 . 3 73 . 8 13 . 6 15 . 6 86 . 2 0
α2 -0.393 0.040 0.140 -0.009 -1.217 -1.275
std error 0.291 0.512 0.697 1.040 1.221 1.552
φ1 -0.146 0.024 0.248 0.274 0.019 -0.001
std error 0.120 0.132 0.157 0.126 0.158 0.154
φ2 0.188 0.079 0.390 0.341 0.308 0.284
std error 0.060 0.063 0.067 0.094 0.082 0.088
σ1 13.4 20.8 23.5 24.2 24.0 26.5
s t d  e r r o r1 . 1 91 . 9 72 . 6 52 . 5 42 . 4 62 . 9 6
σ2 2.33 4.82 7.48 9.45 13.29 15.91
s t d  e r r o r0 . 2 50 . 4 40 . 5 20 . 8 30 . 9 51 . 0 8




Table 3: Hypothesis testing results of the equality of each parameter 
across regimes for the MSAR(1) model 
 
n 123456
W a l d - s t a t1 7 . 91 2 . 16 . 2 17 . 8 51 6 . 01 5 . 9
p-value 0.000 0.001 0.013 0.005 0.000 0.000
Wald-stat 5.65 0.129 0.717 0.175 2.52 2.28
p-value 0.017 0.720 0.397 0.675 0.112 0.131
Wald-stat 91.11 69.45 37.00 33.53 15.88 10.96





Table 4: Comparison of autoregressive models 
 
Panel A: In-sample Markov Switching Criterion (MSC) 
n 123456
AR(1) 1565.05 1675.66 1714.84 1768.94 1819.94 1868.38
MSAR(1) 1433.96 1557.92 1638.92 1722.84 1794.34 1850.75
EGARCH-AR(1) 1421.57 1531.28 1633.79 1719.53 1795.68 1854.06
EGARCH-AR(1) (φn=0) 1435.74 1551.53 1672.97 1760.72 1831.03 1886.88
EGARCH-AR(1)  (αn=φn=0) 1433.78 1550.41 1671.03 1759.03 1830.02 1887.29
 
 
Panel B: Out-of-sample root mean squared error (RMSE) 
n 123456
AR(1) 8.33 12.94 13.88 16.16 18.54 21.42
MSAR(1) 7.95 12.78 13.40 15.64 17.40 20.57
EGARCH-AR(1) 7.95 12.84 13.82 16.09 18.41 21.32
EGARCH-AR(1) (φn=0) 8.06 12.83 15.02 17.66 19.96 22.34
EGARCH-AR(1)  (αn=φn=0) 8.15 13.28 15.55 18.26 20.76 23.27
 
 
Panel C: Statistical significance of out-of sample RMSE improvement 
n 123456
CW test statistic 4.304 1.923 3.343 3.025 2.750 2.727
approximate upper bound
for p-value
0.000 0.027 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003
Monte Carlo p-value 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000
CW test statistic 2.962 1.599 1.271 1.171 1.186 0.966
approximate upper bound
for p-value




Table 5: Estimation results for the AR(1)-EGARCH model 
 
n 123456
α -0.118 -0.333 -0.089 0.674 1.066 1.749
std error 0.243 0.332 0.612 0.815 1.208 1.317
φ 0.096 0.162 0.354 0.373 0.382 0.366
std error 0.066 0.054 0.056 0.057 0.057 0.059
γ 4.85 5.52 5.60 5.61 5.89 6.09
s t d  e r r o r0 . 4 50 . 4 30 . 4 20 . 3 60 . 3 80 . 3 2
δ 0.600 0.828 0.880 0.879 0.893 0.895
std error 0.181 0.171 0.078 0.096 0.099 0.134
η 0.188 0.109 0.100 0.076 0.049 0.034
std error 0.072 0.064 0.068 0.065 0.053 0.065
ξ -23.2 -23.9 -15.3 -9.78 -7.18 -5.97
s t d  e r r o r3 . 9 34 . 1 13 . 8 23 . 1 13 . 0 22 . 7 7
ν 2.05 2.08 3.07 3.42 4.07 4.12
s t d  e r r o r0 . 4 30 . 4 40 . 7 60 . 8 31 . 2 51 . 1 9
Log-likelihood -610 -665 -717 -759 -798 -82728 
Table 6: Comparison of predictive regressions based on in-sample MSC 
 
Panel A: Homoskedastic 
n 123456
12-month job growth 1566.26 1673.13 1711.58 1764.43 1815.35 1863.12
Real-time 12-month
job growth
1566.54 1674.70 1713.64 1766.93 1817.81 1865.49
Baa minus 10-year
treasury spread
1566.63 1676.79 1716.21 1770.27 1821.27 1869.73
10-year minus 5-year
treasury spread
1567.01 1677.64 1716.68 1770.82 1821.83 1870.39
5-year minus 2-year
treasury spread
1567.02 1677.68 1716.82 1770.66 1821.50 1869.40
2-year minus 1-year
treasury spread
1566.29 1677.71 1716.76 1770.22 1820.44 1867.56
1-year minus 6-month
treasury spread
1567.10 1677.03 1716.81 1770.98 1821.78 1869.90
 
 
Panel B: Markov-switching 
n 123456
12-month job growth 1439.27 1558.97 1643.92 1728.14 1801.18 1858.37
Real-time 12-month
job growth
1441.06 1561.91 1646.36 1730.29 1802.20 1859.26
Baa minus 10-year
treasury spread
1439.60 1560.77 1645.47 1730.43 1803.21 1859.45
10-year minus 5-year
treasury spread
1442.78 1566.31 1647.51 1730.70 1801.81 1857.21
5-year minus 2-year
treasury spread
1443.24 1566.75 1646.64 1729.55 1800.77 1860.16
2-year minus 1-year
treasury spread
1439.64 1563.01 1642.21 1722.93 1793.31 1852.81
1-year minus 6-month
treasury spread
1438.48 1559.17 1632.84 1715.87 1789.70 1849.41
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Table 6 (continued)  
 
Panel C: EGARCH 
n 123456
12-month job growth 1423.75 1533.39 1633.55 1718.55 1794.34 1852.41
Real-time 12-month
job growth
1423.73 1533.43 1634.93 1719.92 1795.81 1853.85
Baa minus 10-year
treasury spread
1423.63 1532.44 1635.71 1721.58 1797.41 1855.77
10-year minus 5-year
treasury spread
1423.23 1533.47 1635.41 1721.59 1797.85 1856.24
5-year minus 2-year
treasury spread
1423.75 1532.84 1633.70 1719.69 1796.38 1854.72
2-year minus 1-year
treasury spread
1420.76 1525.05 1629.78 1715.84 1793.01 1851.49
1-year minus 6-month
treasury spread
1421.97 1524.99 1629.40 1716.97 1795.75 1854.79
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Table 7: Estimated coefficients on the explanatory variable for the MSPR models 
 
n123456
β1 -5.097 -13.853 -10.686 -8.436 2.659 3.043
std error 2.817 4.852 5.495 4.554 5.762 6.239
β2 0.363 0.878 -0.957 -1.648 -4.410 -4.615
std error 0.472 0.868 1.171 2.001 2.777 3.251
β1 -1.882 -5.160 -3.719 -2.912 1.888 1.914
std error 1.525 2.315 2.732 2.366 2.885 2.558
β2 0.135 0.510 -0.259 -0.547 -1.582 -1.499
std error 0.231 0.400 0.625 0.964 1.401 1.246
β1 0.045 0.113 0.128 0.099 -0.029 -0.052
std error 0.024 0.052 0.071 0.080 0.063 0.066
β2 -0.006 -0.014 -0.002 -0.003 0.014 0.018
std error 0.005 0.009 0.012 0.017 0.025 0.031
β1 -0.016 -0.059 -0.128 -0.142 -0.312 -0.294
std error 0.056 0.107 0.128 0.132 0.142 0.153
β2 -0.004 -0.011 0.005 0.009 -0.013 -0.020
std error 0.007 0.013 0.019 0.023 0.035 0.040
β1 0.002 -0.054 -0.070 -0.061 -0.054 -0.142
std error 0.033 0.069 0.075 0.066 0.060 0.102
β2 0.000 -0.003 0.013 0.026 0.040 0.006
std error 0.005 0.009 0.014 0.019 0.024 0.030
β1 -0.004 -0.204 -0.168 -0.133 -0.112 -0.072
std error 0.055 0.114 0.114 0.095 0.099 0.115
β2 0.019 0.019 0.060 0.129 0.197 0.253
std error 0.011 0.017 0.030 0.044 0.054 0.073
β1 -0.076 -0.313 -0.206 -0.200 -0.186 -0.148
std error 0.076 0.160 0.120 0.123 0.131 0.150
β2 0.035 0.054 0.196 0.267 0.331 0.412














Table 8: Estimation results for the MSPR model (1y-6m treasury yield spread) 
 
n 123456
p11 0.796 0.800 0.933 0.938 0.947 0.945
std error 0.071 0.096 0.038 0.035 0.032 0.031
p22 0.841 0.918 0.966 0.962 0.962 0.958
std error 0.048 0.038 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.021
α1 8.72 19.9 14.26 15.1 15.8 15.7
s t d  e r r o r2 . 3 85 . 5 94 . 3 04 . 6 24 . 9 14 . 9 6
α2 -0.969 -0.739 -3.68 -4.81 -6.39 -8.18
std error 0.498 0.650 1.13 1.42 1.78 2.62
φ1 -0.131 -0.071 0.164 0.196 0.197 0.210
std error 0.112 0.158 0.143 0.128 0.127 0.116
φ2 0.096 0.094 0.311 0.314 0.260 0.210
std error 0.145 0.061 0.078 0.069 0.092 0.102
β1 -0.076 -0.313 -0.206 -0.200 -0.186 -0.148
std error 0.076 0.160 0.120 0.123 0.131 0.150
β2 0.035 0.054 0.196 0.267 0.331 0.412
std error 0.024 0.032 0.050 0.064 0.086 0.110
σ1 13.3 20.0 21.6 23.2 24.8 27.5
s t d  e r r o r1 . 1 62 . 1 02 . 1 92 . 1 12 . 0 82 . 3 9
σ2 2.26 4.86 6.70 8.47 10.7 12.7
s t d  e r r o r0 . 2 40 . 4 20 . 4 80 . 6 40 . 8 01 . 0 1
Log-likelihood -611 -671 -708 -749 -786 -816
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Table 9: Comparison of predictive regressions based on out-of-sample RMSE 
Panel A: Homoskedastic 
n 123456
12-month job growth 8.62 13.52 14.34 16.45 18.75 21.40
Real-time 12-month
job growth
8.56 13.40 14.24 16.41 18.75 21.46
Baa minus 10-year
treasury spread
8.64 13.19 14.29 16.67 19.08 22.14
10-year minus 5-year
treasury spread
8.40 13.02 13.92 16.20 18.59 21.50
5-year minus 2-year
treasury spread
8.43 13.07 14.04 16.32 18.71 21.52
2-year minus 1-year
treasury spread
8.54 13.16 14.22 16.50 18.84 21.54
1-year minus 6-month
treasury spread
8.45 13.04 14.13 16.51 18.89 21.80
 
 
Panel B: Markov-switching (approximate p-values in parentheses) 
n 123456
8.20 13.27 13.26 15.78 17.79 20.64
(0.005) (0.118) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
8.09 13.07 13.46 15.89 18.15 21.27
(0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.009) (0.001) (0.215)
8.30 13.51 13.45 16.18 18.13 21.06
(0.000) (0.387) (0.002) (0.054) (0.001) (0.000)
7.97 12.81 13.44 15.73 17.55 20.33
(0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.009)
8.10 12.91 13.53 15.73 17.77 20.86
(0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
8.21 13.03 13.47 15.68 17.71 20.65
(0.000) (0.016) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000)
8.15 13.27 13.09 15.02 17.61 20.48















Table 9 (continued)  
 
Panel C: EGARCH (approximate p-values in parentheses) 
n 123456
7.78 12.49 13.46 15.60 18.00 20.81
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
7.83 12.67 13.64 15.79 18.16 21.00
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003)
8.15 13.50 14.63 17.05 18.81 21.72
(0.003) (0.075) (0.244) (0.360) (0.071) (0.038)
7.83 12.82 13.90 16.20 18.55 21.41
(0.000) (0.016) (0.159) (0.223) (0.223) (0.197)
7.87 12.80 13.86 16.15 18.47 21.31
(0.000) (0.005) (0.008) (0.023) (0.031) (0.047)
8.18 12.95 13.95 16.27 18.50 21.31
(0.000) (0.013) (0.022) (0.045) (0.024) (0.119)
8.14 13.03 14.38 16.46 18.58 21.53
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Figure 2: Comparison of the predicted values from the MSAR model and predictive regression for 























Notes to Figure 2. Dotted line: observed value of u6t for each month t.  Bold line: predicted value 
of u6t based on information available as of month t - 1 using the predictive regression based on 
growth in nonfarm payrolls.  Gray line: predicted value of u6t based on information available as of 
month t - 1 using Markov-switching autoregression and no other explanatory variables. 36 
 
Figure 3. Rolling-sample versus full-sample comparison of predicted holding returns on 4-month 
contract from predictive regression based on employment growth, from Markov-switching 








































Notes to Figure 3.  Top panel: solid line is forecast of employment-based predictive regression 
(12) estimated from a rolling sample ending at the indicated date, while dotted line is forecast of 
same model using the full sample of data.  Middle panel: solid line is forecast of Markov- 
switching employment-based predictive regression (13) estimated from a rolling sample ending at 
the indicated date, while dotted line is forecast of same model using the full sample of data.  
Bottom panel: solid line is forecast of Markov-switching autoregression (8) using a rolling sample 
ending at the indicated date, while dotted line is forecast of same model using the full sample.37 






















Notes to Figure 4. Dotted line: observed value of u5t for each month t.  Bold line: predicted value 
of u5t based on information available as of month t - 1 using Markov-switching autoregression and 
no other explanatory variables.  Gray line: predicted value of u5t based on information available 
as of month t - 1 using Markov-switching predictive regression autoregression based on 1-year 
minus 6-month spread. 38 
Figure 5: Predicted interest rates on fed funds futures contracts as of June 30, 2009 under 













Notes to Figure 5.  Average: implied fed funds futures rate if market expects fed funds rate to 
remain at 18 basis points through the end of 2009 but futures contracts embody historical average 
risk premia.  Regime 1: market expects fed funds rate to remain at 18 basis points through the 
end of 2009 but futures contracts embody risk premia appropriate if June 2009 is known to have 
been governed by regime 1.  Actual: actual fed funds futures rates on June 30, 2009. 